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ABSTRACT: This paper aims to address the role of subordinated liabilities within the new 
resolution framework resulting from the post-crisis reforms.  
In particular, this study starts from the resolution intervention of four Italian banks in 
November 2015. The legal analysis of that resolution is complemented by an empirical 
analysis of the determinants of subordinated debt issuances for Italian banks.  
From this set of evidence is possible to infer the desirability of a well-functioning and 
dynamic market for subordinated debt. On the other hand, what clearly emerges is the 
incompatibility between such a market and the new regulatory framework as it is.  
Therefore, the paper, given the compelling arguments showing the inefficiency of a 
pure mandatory bail-in mechanism for subordinated debt, proposes to complement it 
with a contractual clause to bail-in subordinated creditors, tailored on coco bonds 
model, in order to enhance certainty amongst the contractual parties. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
After the global financial crisis in 2007 and the sovereign debt crisis in 2011, 
the lack of a common regulatory framework for banking supervision and 
resolution has been identified as one of the main drivers of European, and 
especially the Eurozone, stagnation.  
 The European policy maker reacted implementing the European 
Banking Union (hereinafter E.B.U.)1 to enhance financial stability and make a 
step forward towards a genuine economic and monetary union.2 The new E.B.U. 
consists of three main pillars:3 a Single Supervisory Mechanism for the 
Eurozone (hereinafter S.S.M.),4 a new Deposit Guarantee Scheme (hereinafter 
D.G.S.)5 and a new framework for the resolution of distressed banks.6  
 Within the resolution intervention, the bail-in tool attracted the 
utmost attention of both media and scholars.7 A bank bail-in8 is a tool that the 
Resolution Authority can employ once a resolution is triggered. The power to 
write down (Article 63 (1)(e) B.R.R.D.) or convert into ordinary shares (Article 
63 (1)(f) B.R.R.D.) eligible liabilities issued by the bank under resolution 
constitute a bail-in. Therefore, a bail-in represents a balance sheet operation 
                                                          
† Edoardo Martino LL.M., Ph.D. Candidate in Law & Economics at Rotterdam Institute of Law and 
Economics, Erasmus School of Law. The author is grateful to Dr. Jaroslaw Beldowski and Dr. 
Wiktor Wojciechowski for their supervision on this work. Usual disclaimers apply. 
1  See the ‘Conclusions document’ of the European Council (28/29 June 2012).  
2 See HERMAN VAN ROMPUY, TOWARDS A GENUINE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION (2012). 
3 See DANNY BUSH & GUIDO FERRARINI, EUROPEAN BANKING UNION (2015). 
4 Council Regulation 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European 
Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, 2013 
O.J. (L 287), 63. 
5 Directive 2014/49 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014, on deposit 
guarantee schemes, 2014 O.J. (L 173), 149. 
6 Directive 2014/59, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 Establishing a 
Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and 
Amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 
2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 
1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2014 O.J. (L173), 
190, and – specifically for the Eurozone - Single Resolution Mechanism – Regulation 806/2014, of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a 
uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the 
framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, 2014 O.J. (L 225), 1. 
7 For a survey about the challenges stemming from bail-in, see Goodhart, Charles; Charles 
Goodhart & Emilios Avgouleas, A Critical Evaluation Of Bail-Ins As Bank Recapitalisation Mechanisms, 
SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2478647 (Aug. 12, 2014). 
8 See Paul Calello & Wilson Ervin, From bail-out to bail-in, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 2010. 
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to recapitalize and restore the viability of the distressed institution.9 In this 
way, the State should not be “forced” to bail those banks out and, 
consequently, would avoid burdening tax-payers with bank savings.10 
The specific objective of this paper is to address the consequences that 
the new resolution tools have on subordinated liabilities market in a dynamic 
perspective; meaning that the paper considers not only how the new regulation 
affects a particular class of creditors, but also whether such new framework 
incentivizes a shift in the characteristic of subordinated bonds and 
bondholders and the expected outcome of the whole process.  
 This paper discusses the desirability of a developed market for 
subordinated bonds and – at the same time – the inefficiency of a purely 
mandatory debt conversion regime. Eventually, a contractual model tailored on 
the contingent capital instrument is proposed to make all the actors involved 
better-off. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows: Section § 2 provides an 
introduction to the banks’ financial structure and creditors’ safeguards in case 
of bail-in, as disciplined in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
(hereinafter B.R.R.D). Section § 3 analyzes an anecdotal evidence from Italy, 
where the Bank of Italy, along with Ministry of Economic and Finance, 
resolved four banks in November 2015. The key point of that resolution 
intervention was, indeed, writing down the bank subordinated debt. Section § 
4 tries to test empirically which are the determinants of subordinated debt, 
using a sample of Italian banks and listed subordinated bonds. Finally, Section 
§ 5 discusses the incentives for banks and bondholders to include in their 
agreement a clause to convert and/or write-down the credit when a given 
trigger event occurs (Section § 5).  
Throughout this paper the so-called “Law and Economics” 
methodology is widely applied. This basically means that the legal analysis 
concerning bail-in and subordinated bond is closely tied to the analysis of 
                                                          
9 See Simon Gleeson, Special Paper, Legal Aspects Of Bank Bail-Ins, 2012 LONDON SCH. ECON. FINAN. 
MKT. GROUP PAPER SERIES ¶ SP205. 
10 During the 2007-08, crisis almost 37% of aggregate E.U. Member State GDP was spent to avoid 
banks failure. See E.C.B. Report on EU Banking Structures, (Sept. 2010), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/eubankingstructures201009en.pdf?cd7ac9e5cf703dabf8
6f35ac0140f225. 
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economic consequences of the legal framework,11 borrowing from basic 
microeconomic theory and econometrics. 
 
 
 2. BAIL-IN, DEBT AND CREDITOR’S TREATMENT 
2.1 RAISING CAPITAL IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
Before starting any analysis of banks bail-in and its impact on subordinated 
debt, it seems to be wise taking a step back and examining how banks raise 
their capital, i.e.: how they make decisions concerning the source for funding 
firm’s activities. In fact, the decisions about capital and debt structure are 
going to be a crucial aspect of the paper.  
An intuitive division is usually drawn between debt and equity, anyhow 
– given the large variety of debt and equity instrument available – the source 
of funding can be better visualized as a vector ordered according to the loss 
absorbency capacity of each particular financial instrument: clearly, pure 
equity instruments have a higher loss absorbency capacity in case of failure 
and debt tools have lower and lower capacity to absorb losses. From the 
investor’s standpoint, a greater loss absorbing capacity means a higher risk 
profile of the investment.  
For standard economic reasoning, in deciding its capital structure, each 
firm strives to find a mix of different capital instruments which maximize the 
difference between marginal cost and marginal benefit of capital (e.g.: tax 
incentives, cash flow incentives).12  
The first issue that has to be highlighted is that a bank’s financial 
structure has many peculiarities compared to non-financial corporations. 
These can be explained by focusing on two aspects: the role of financial 
structure for banking activity and the social cost of banks failure. Indeed, the 
financial structure of banks is per se highly leveraged, as the core business of 
                                                          
11 For an extensive introduction see ROBERT D. COOPER, LAW AND ECONOMICS (Pearson Education eds., 
6th ed. 2011). ; see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis Of Law, in 3 HANDBOOK OF 
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1661-1784 (Martin Feldstein & A.J. Auerbach eds., 2002). 
12 See Jianping Zhou et al., From Bail-out to Bail-in: Mandatory Debt Restructuring Of Systemic Financial 
Institutions, 12/03 INT’L MONETARY FOUND STAFF DISCUSSION NOTES, Apr. 24, 2012, at 21. 
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commercial banks is to transform short term lending (mostly deposits) into 
long term borrowings. In other words, capital structure is part of what banks 
do and not only the result of a strategy to raise funds.13 Moreover, since bank 
activities have a systemic importance for economic stability,14 the social cost of 
banks bankruptcy is by far more severe than for every other kind of 
corporation.15 
Any policy suggestion has to carefully consider those two aspects in 
making proposals to reform banks capital structure whose purpose is to 
enhance the loss absorbency capacity of banks’ liabilities.  
After the global financial crisis, (too) high leverage in banks’ balance 
sheets was intensively criticized, and several scholars proposed to set a 
minimum requirement of equity far higher than the Basel III requirements. 
The underlying assumption of most of those proposals is the belief that 
gathering debt is not cheaper than raising equity.16 This position borrows from 
Modigliani and Miller’s Indifference Propositions, according to which – 
assuming “no cost of bankruptcy” and “perfect information” – the cost of 
raising capital is independent of the debt/equity structure of the firm.17 The 
departure from that proposition generates a huge stream of literature on 
corporate finance which will be helpful later on, in the empirical analysis of 
determinants of subordinated debt issues. In fact, the “no cost of bankruptcy” 
and the “perfect information” assumptions, which represent the baseline of 
the Modigliani and Miller’s model, turn to be rather unrealistic, especially for 
the banking sector.  
Furthermore, increasing the share of equity in banks financial structure 
cannot be considered a policy goal per se. In fact, the first-order purpose is to 
enhance loss absorbency capacity of bank liabilities and, hence, make them 
more resilient. Thus, in governing future financial crisis, the debt shall play a 
                                                          
13 See Paul Davies, The Fall And Rise Of Debt: Bank Capital Regulation After The Crisis, 16 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. 
REV., 491, 500 (2015). 
14 See Olivier Blanchard, Giovanni Dell’Arriccia & Paolo Mauro, Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy, 42 
J.MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 199, 206 (2010). 
15 See, for instance MATEJ MARINC & RAZVAN VLAHU, THE ECONOMICS OF BANK BANKRUPTCY LAW (2011). 
16 See, e.g., ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH 
BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (updated ed., 2014). 
17 See Franco Modigliani & Merton Howard Miller, The Cost Of Capital, Corporation Finance And The 
Theory Of Investment, 48 THE AM. ECON. REV. 261-297 (1958). 
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role in absorbing losses, and this can be considered the overarching policy goal 
of the bail-in.18 
For what specifically concerns subordinated debtholders in banks, their 
role was highly studied at the beginning of the millennium, during the 
discussion preceding the Basel II agreement, as a tool to enhance bank’s 
governance via market discipline mechanism.19 A certain consensus arose 
around the fact that imposing market discipline via subordinated debt is 
technically feasible, even though the market discipline mechanism was 
disturbed by the implicit guarantee of the sovereign on domestic banks 
solvency. 
Although those represent quite outdated evidence, they acquire a new 
importance thinking that the new E.B.U. mainly aims to eliminate both the 
implicit guarantee of domestic sovereignty and the “too big (or too complex, 
international, important) to fail” policy. Therefore, considering that evidence 
and the new European institutional framework, a considerable improvement in 
market discipline mechanism via subordinated debt can be predicted, given the 
greater incentives to fully internalize the costs (i.e.: risk) of subordinated 
bonds,20 since subordinated bondholders are particularly prone to bear losses in 
a resolution process. 
However, the bail-in tool goes far beyond the mere market discipline 
mechanism, since it enhances and makes effective the loss absorbency capacity 
of debt instruments21.  
On the other hand, the role of subordinated debt in the bail-in process 
there are not straightforward answers, as well noted by Paul Davies:  
Whilst subordinated debt has survived a real-life performance which 
would have caused most teams to be relegated, its final role in bank 
capital is not yet absolutely clear. The FSB is the cheer-leader for 
subordinated debt in resolution […]. The Bank Recovery and 
                                                          
18 Gleeson, supra note 9, at 267. 
19 See Andrea Sironi, Testing for Market discipline in the European Banking industry: evidence from 
subordinated debt issues, 35 J. MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 443 (2003) ; see also Jürg M. Blum, 
Subordinated debt, market discipline and banks’ risk taking, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 1427 (2002). 
20 Zhou et al., supra note 12, at 20. 
21 See BASEL COMMITEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT PROPOSAL TO ENSURE THE LOSS 
ABSORBENCY OF REGULATORY CAPITAL AT THE POINT OF NON-VIABILITY (2010)  
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs174.pdf. 
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Resolution Directive of the E.U. requires the issuance of 
subordinated debt to promote resolution but is circumspect on the 
actual proportion.22  
The last remark about the importance of pricing internalization should be 
devoted to the positive repercussions of reducing the spillover effect from 
domestic banks to sovereign and vice versa. As incisively noticed by Paul 
Tucker: “For banking risk, the genie is out of the bottle. If the risk is not priced 
into bank bonds, it will be priced into government bonds. The people deserve 
better”.23 
 
2.2 B.R.R.D. AND CREDITOR’S TREATMENT 
The narrative and the policy goals that led to the B.R.R.D. and bail-in is 
nowadays well known and a systemic introduction on the theme falls well 
beyond the scope of this paper.24 Nevertheless, a brief introduction to the 
principles on creditors’ treatment included in the B.R.R.D. is useful both to 
concretize the theoretical statements made in § 2.1 and to introduce the 
anecdotal evidence in § 3. Three main aspects are to be discussed: which are 
the bail-in eligible creditors; what are their safeguards during the resolution 
process and their role in capital regulation. 
The idea itself of the bail-in makes clear that the position of creditors 
vis-à-vis the bank insiders and the resolution authorities represents one of the 
key elements of the new framework.25 
To begin understanding the position of creditors under B.R.R.D., a good 
starting point is the second part of the recital n. 67: the goal of creditors 
involvement within the resolution process is to avoid moral hazard of – at 
least big – creditors, giving incentives to engage in monitoring activities. This 
                                                          
22 Davies, supra note 13, at 510. 
23 Paul Tucker, The resolution of financial institutions without taxpayer solvency support: Seven 
retrospective clarifications and elaboration, CTR. FOR ECON. POL’Y RES. EUR. SUMMER SYMP. IN ECON. 
THEORY, Jul. 3, 2014, at 1, 10. 
24 To have a good idea of what happened both from a policy and legal perspective see, FINANCIAL 
STABILITY BOARD, KEY ATTRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION REGIMES FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,. (2014); 
Goodhart & Avgouleas, supra note 7; Thomas Conlon & John Cotter, Anatomy of a bail-in, 15 J. OF FIN. 
STABILITY 257 (2014); Christos Hadjiemmanuil, Bank Stakeholders' Mandatory Contribution to 
Resolution Financing: Principle and Ambiguities of Bail-In, 2015 EUR. CENT. BANK LEGAL CONF., 225. 
25 See Jens-Henrich Binder, The Position of Creditors Under the BRRD, BANK OF GREECE CTR. FOR CULTURE 
(2016). 
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rationale holds if and only if creditors are actually capable of monitoring 
banking activities, i.e.: creditors with sufficient expertise.26 
Thus, in determining the classes of bail-in eligible liabilities, three 
guidelines have to be considered: exclude debt holders that threaten the 
systemic stability in case of write-down or conversion (the so-called runnable 
liabilities); include debt holders that can successfully fulfill the monitoring 
task; exempt particular classes of creditors that deserve to be protected for 
other reasons. 
The B.R.R.D. normative strategy consists in granting a general and ex-
ante exemption from bail-in to specific groups of creditors (Article 44 (2) 
B.R.R.D.) and allocate to the Resolution Authority the power to exempt on a 
case-by-case assessment other liabilities that are theoretically bail-in eligible. 
The purpose of this case-by-case assessment is to preserve the continuity of 
critical activities of the resolving bank and avoid the risk of contagion (Article 
44 (3) B.R.R.D.).  
In particular, a general ex-ante exemption has been granted to 
depositors whose deposits are covered by the D.G.S. (deposit up to 100,000€); 
secured liabilities (e.g.: covered bond); liabilities toward client for what 
concern fiduciary custody of assets; short-term inter-bank operations; 
wholesale short-term arrangements (e.g.: repos); liabilities toward workers 
and retail creditors supplying good and services.  
Therefore, all the other liabilities fall within the scope of bail-in, i.e.: 
the resolution authorities have the power to write off or convert them, 
according to the safeguards of article 34 of the Directive: 
1) creditors bear losses after shareholders according to the order of 
priority of their credits under classical insolvency procedure (Article 34 (1)(b));  
2) within each class, creditors are treated in an equitable manner 
(Article 34 (1)(f));  
                                                          
26 Cf On this instance GÖTZ, Martin R., et al. Should the marketing of subordinated debt be 
restricted/different in one way or the other? What to do in the case of mis-selling? Goethe 
University Frankfurt, Research Center SAFE-Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, 2016. 
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3) creditors cannot bear higher losses than would have been incurred 
under normal insolvency procedure (no creditor worse-off principle - Article 
34 (1)(g)). 
The application of the first two principles, apart from some ambiguities27 and 
difficulties in the coordination of likely divergent national legislations, appear 
quite straightforward. On the other hand, the no-creditor-worse-off principle 
(hereinafter N.C.W.O.) creates much more doubts and implementation issues. 
Moreover, it is crucial to analyze this principle in order to understand what will 
be the likely role of subordinated debt in the new institutional framework of 
banks resolution.  
The N.C.W.O. principle asks the resolution authority to make a 
counterfactual assessment, establishing (Article 74) the value of bailed-in 
liabilities that would have resulted from the normal insolvency procedure. This 
hypothetical value represents the minimum level of protection for creditors;28 
but, as in all the cases, requires a difficult counterfactual assessment, thus 
serious effectiveness concerns might arise.29  
These concerns, which are surely serious and well-grounded, can be 
approached in a wholly different way, looking at the N.C.W.O. principle as a 
substitute for the lack of ex-ante safeguards (vote, court hearing, public 
consultation, etc.) for creditors.30 To better grasp the economic rationale of the 
latter statement, the very first step is to transpose the N.C.W.O. protection into 
the classic Law and Economic trade-off between “Property Rule” and 
“Liability Rule”.31 
First of all, the underlying entitlement that N.C.W.O. principle wants to 
grant shall be defined as follows: “In the B.R.R.D., bailed-in creditors are 
entitled not to suffer higher losses compared to a liquidation scenario”; 
therefore, the only relevant point to be answered is: how to enforce such an 
entitlement? In this instance, the entitlement is not protected through an 
                                                          
27 Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 24, at 225-248, 241-244. 
28 Binder, supra note 25, at 10. 
29 See George Jacobs & David Mitchell, The no-creditor-worse-off principle from a valuation perspective: 
standing in the shoo of a hypothetical liquidator, 29 BUTTERWORTH’S J. INT’L  BANKING AND FIN. L. (2014). 
30 Gleeson, supra note 9, at 265. 
31 See  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L REV. 1089 (1972). 
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absolute and ex-ante mechanism that prevents creditors to be worse-off, 
which in Calabresi and Melamed taxonomy is called “property rule”. 
Nevertheless, creditors are still protected through a different mechanism. In 
fact, the N.C.W.O. principle acts as a blueprint that should guide the resolution 
authority’s activities plus – and especially – as ex-post “liability rule” that 
assure the compensation of creditors worse-off in the resolution process (as 
provided by Article 75).  
Assuming a costless litigation procedure, the economic outcome 
stemming from a property and liability rule will be equivalent for the creditors. 
If the latter assumption is relaxed, the rationale behind such an institutional 
design can be summarized as follows: bail-in represents a value-creating 
process compared to the traditional insolvency procedure. In a nutshell, the 
reduction in transaction costs overweight the positive cost of administrating 
the Justice. 
Considering the time constraints under which a bail-in shall be applied 
and the value of systemic stability, the approach of European regulator makes 
a lot of sense from a social welfare standpoint.  
Finally, to properly grasp the role of debt – and thus creditors – in the 
E.B.U. mechanism, a brief overview on financial structure regulation contained 
in B.R.R.D. has to be presented.32 First of all, Article 45 B.R.R.D. provides that 
institutions shall meet at all times a minimum requirement of bail-in eligible 
liabilities (hereinafter M.R.E.L.). 
Article 45 § 4 lists the necessary characteristic to consider a liability as 
eligible: be issued and entirely paid up; not deriving from infra-group 
operation; have a remaining maturity of at least one year; not arising from a 
derivative or a deposit covered by D.G.S.  
                                                          
32 Anyhow, the core of the financial structure regulation is contained C.R.R./C.R.D. IV package 
represents the European implementation of Basel III accords. ( For a survey of the main regulatory 
features of C.R.R./C.R.D. IV), see Rainer Masera, CRR/CRD IV: the trees and the forest, SSRN, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2418215; (On the possible overlaps and 
inconsistencies between BRRD and CRR/CRD IV regulation) see  Bart Joosen, Bail in Mechanisms in 
the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, SSRN,  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2511886. 
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In this instance, the approach of E.U. legislator appropriately departs from the 
one-size-fits-all paradigm.33 Indeed, Article 45 (6) B.R.R.D. provides several 
criteria to the resolution authorities to determine a specific M.R.E.L. for each 
institution.34  
Another relevant piece of this complex puzzle is a document about Total 
Loss Absorbency Capacity (hereinafter T.L.A.C.) for Systematically Important 
Financial Institutions (hereinafter S.I.F.Is.), issued by Financial Stability Board 
(2015). F.S.B. suggests setting a minimum fix requirement of bail-in eligible 
liabilities between sixteen and twenty percent of risk-weighted assets 
(hereinafter R.W.A. (Pillar 1) plus an adjunctive buffer to be determined on an 
individual basis (Pillar 2).35 
Nonetheless, for what is here of interest, subordinated liabilities are 
certainly part of eligible liabilities if the remaining maturity period is longer 
than one year. At the same time, they can or cannot be part of the regulatory 
capital (as Additional Tier 1 or Tier 2) depending on whether the tight Capital 
Requirements Regulations (hereinafter C.R.R.) standards are fulfilled.  
The next section is going to apply this theoretical and normative 
framework to an Italian case study of November 2015, when four medium-
small banks were resolved by the National Resolution Authority (i.e.: Bank of 
Italy) and the role of subordinated debt was crucial. 
 
 
                                                          
33 The one-size-fits-all approach is, instead, adopted by C.R.R./C.R.D. IV package in order to 
establish a consistent internal market for banks. This approach has been widely criticized since it 
artificially creates higher compliance costs for medium and small banks, favouring S.I.F.Is. which 
can enjoy economies of scale. 
34 The European Banking Authority implemented a Draft Regulatory Technical Standards to 
concretely implement such criteria, see EBA FINAL Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on 
criteria for determining the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities under 
Directive 2014/59/EU, EBA/RTS/2015/05, final (3 July 2015); see also EBA Interim report on MREL, 
Report on implementation and design of the MREL framework, EBA-Op-2016-12, (19 July 2016). 
The base to determine the bank specific requirement is the “own fund requirement” provided by 
C.R.R. plus any additional requirement to hold own funds in excess. From this starting point, the 
Resolution Authority can increase or even decrease the amount of M.R.E.L. considering the risk 
profile, the business model and the funding model of each institution. 
35 The conformance period is not sure yet, but not before 2019. The application of T.L.A.C. 
standards is consistent with M.R.E.L., even though in other instances, the minimum requirement 
pursuing B.R.R.D. can substantially deviate from T.L.A.C. standards. 
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3. THE ITALIAN ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE 
3.1. THE NARRATIVE AND SOME CAVEATS 
The 21st November 2015, the Bank of Italy resolved four Italian territorial 
banks via “Sale of goods” tool to a bridge entity. The day after, the 
bureaucratic process to establish the bridge banks was speeded up by the 
government with the so-called “Bank Saving Decree” (D.L. n. 183/2015). 
The four resolved banks are Banca Marche, Banca Popolare dell’Etruria 
e del Lazio, CariChieti and Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara who together used to 
hold 1% of national deposits36. Despite the size of these banks being rather 
small, considering the structure of the Italian entrepreneurial system, their 
viability of was crucial (see Agostino et al., 2011), since those are “territorial” 
banks, coming from a history somehow related to cooperative credit. 
Therefore, the stability and continuity of the credit lines toward S.M.Es. within 
their geographical area assumed an importance far beyond the actual amount 
of deposits or the size of their assets.  
The Bank of Italy, following the strategies arranged in the Resolution 
Plans, created four bridge banks and transferred to them all the assets and 
liabilities, except for equity and subordinated debt.37 A procedure for selling the 
four bridge institutions has already started, and Bank of Italy is striving to 
conclude it as soon as possible.  
On the other hand, for the sake of administrative efficient, only one 
Asset Management Vehicle,38 which can be labeled as ‘Bad Bank’,39 has been 
created, gathering all the equity and subordinated debt of the resolved banks 
                                                          
36 See Lorenzo Stanghellini, The Implementation of the BRRD in Italy and its First Test: Policy 
Implications, 2 J. FIN. REG. 157, 158 (2016); see also Donato Messineo, Il provvedimento «salva-
banche»: il trattamento di azionisti e creditori nella nuova disciplina delle crisi bancarie [The “Salva-
Banche” intervention: shareholders and creditors treatment in the new banking crisis framework], 
36 QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 102 (2016). 
37 The Slovenian Supervisory Authority followed the same strategy in 2013. Recently E.C.J. ruled for 
the legitimacy of bailing-in subordinated liabilities. See Case C-526/14, 19th July 2016. 
38 Directive 2014/59, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 Establishing a 
Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and 
Amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 
2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 
1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2014 O.J. (L173) 
4, 5. 
39 Stanghellini, supra note 36, at 159. 
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on the liabilities side and some non-performing loan on the asset side.40 The 
National Resolution Fund owes the capital of both good and bad banks.41 From 
a balance sheet perspective, the situation of the former banks, the new bridge 
banks, and the bad bank is summarized in Table 1.42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Balance-sheet situation for resolved Bank, 22nd November 2015. 
                                                          
40 Given the systemic relevance of non performing loans in Italian Banking System, currently there 
are proposals to make that “Bad Bank” the Italian systemic bad bank to cope with future possible 
resolution interventions. 
41 The Asset Management Vehicle has been established by the National Resolution Fund, which 
was – in turn – created few days before the resolution intervention, pursuant to Articles 45 and ff. 
of the D.Lgs. n. 180/2015. 
42 BANK OF ITALY, Information about the crisis solution of Banca Marche, Banca Popolare dell’Etruria e 
del Lazio, CariChieti and Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara (Informazioni sulla soluzione delle crisi di Banca 
Marche, Banca Popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio, CariChieti e Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara) (2015). 
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Therefore, Bank of Italy applied a de facto bail-in, even though the legal 
instrument currently employed is different since the full-speed bail-in 
regulation entered into force only on the 1st January 2016. Thus, the relevant 
institutional framework is the 2013 Banking Communication on “burden 
sharing”.43 
For some obscure reasons very little has been written on this argument 
by Italian scholars so far.44 Hence, this paper also wants to try filling such a 
gap. First of all, this resolution intervention dealt with the idiosyncratic crisis 
of relatively small banking institutions, while – in the previous Section –the 
importance of coping with a systemic crisis of S.I.F.Is. was stressed.  
The crisis came from serious mismanagements of all the four resolved 
banks; indeed, all the four banks were already subjected to severe supervisory 
intervention by the Bank of Italy. The only “systemic” aspect of the crisis is 
the crucial role of non-performing loans, which represents one of the central 
problems of Italian banking system. In fact, during the IV quarter of 2015, the 
non-performing loans amount was approximately €350 billion, representing 
almost the 20 % of total loans.45 
This contingency reflects and fosters many concerns around the actual 
effectiveness of bail-in as an on-going concern: an excellent tool for mostly 
idiosyncratic crisis, as substitute of liquidation; but presenting a high risk to be 
useless or even harmful in case of resolution of big institutions in systemic 
crisis.46  
Currently, there are no counterchecks, but it is reasonable to think that 
the strategy of resolution authorities shall consist in “playing tough” with 
small distressed institutions in the next couple of years to engender a credible 
threat and furnish the right incentives to maintain banks viability. In a 
                                                          
43 Commission Communication on the Application, from 1 August 2013 , of State Aid Rules to 
Support Measures in Favour of Banks in the Context of the Financial Crisis ( ‘Banking 
Communication’ ), 2013 O.J. (C 216) 1. 
44 See Antonella Antonucci, Fra Opacità E Regole Tossiche: Il Ruolo Degli Scenari Probabilistici. Scritto per 
Il Convegno 'Salvataggio Bancario E Tutela Del Risparmio' [Between Opacity And Toxic Rules: The Role Of 
Probabilistic scenarios. Written For The Conference'Banking Rescue And Saving Protection'], RIV .DIR. 
BANC., Feb. 2016, at 1.; Stanghellini, supra note 36; Messineo, supra note 44. 
45 BANK OF ITALY, Statistical Bulletin – quarter 1. (2016). 
46 See Goodhart & Avgouleas, supra note 7, at 20; MCANDREWS, James, et al. What Makes Large Bank 
Failures So Messy and What to Do about It?. Economic Policy Review, Forthcoming, 2014. 
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nutshell: the best bail-in for S.I.F.Is. is the bail-in that will never happen 
because of the credible threat established by the regulatory framework itself. 
The resolution intervention has been costless for taxpayers so far since 
the Resolution Fund provided the liquidity to guarantee the continuity of 
critical activities, via an advance payment by Unicredit, Banca Intesa SanPaolo 
e UbiBanca.47 Thus, the policy goal of avoiding taxpayers’ expenditures for 
banks resolution seems to be – at least for the moment – achieved. 
As anticipated above, subordinated bonds played a crucial role: they 
have been fully allocated to the bad bank as the offset for the non-performing 
loans (see again Table 1). The Italian Resolution Authority (Resolution Unit of 
Bank of Italy) publicly admitted that the operation intentionally took place in 
the window between the B.R.R.D. transposition within the Italian legal system48 
and the 1st January 2016, when bail-in entered into force. So that, it was 
possible to avoid both the standard atomistic liquidation and the use of the 
“full bail-in tool”.49 The concerns about using bail-in arose from the fact that 
under bail-in regime a substantial amount of non-subordinated debt should 
have been written off. Thus, the political choice of the Resolution Authority, 
along with Ministry of Economy and Finance, was to use subordinated debt as 
a cushion to protect senior creditors.  
The transitory regime in part justifies and explains this approach: 
people that invested in non-subordinated bond before the “burden-sharing” 
document and the B.R.R.D. drafts were not able to fully internalize the risk of 
the financial instruments they were buying because of the previous distorted 
incentives on which they relied.50 
                                                          
47 See BANK OF ITALY, Information about the crisis solution of Banca Marche, Banca Popolare 
dell’Etruria e del Lazio, CariChieti and Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara (Informazioni sulla soluzione 
delle crisi di Banca Marche, Banca Popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio, CariChieti e Cassa di 
Risparmio di Ferrara) (2015).  
48 D.Lgs. n. 180/2015 and D.Lgs. n. 181/2015. 
49 See BARBAGALLO, Carmelo. Camera dei deputati – Indagine conoscitiva sul sistema bancario italiano. 
Audizione di Carmelo Barbagallo. Capo del Dipartimento Vigilanza Bancaria e Finanziaria  Banca d’Italia 
[Italian Chamber of Deputies – Cognitive survey over Italian banking system. Hearing of Carmelo 
Barbagallo. Chief of Banking and Financial Supervisory Department, Bank of Italy] (Dec. 9, 2015), p. 9. 
50 It is important to note that “Trust” is an informal institution that has a great importance in 
social behaviors and, at the same time, is particularly troublesome and time-consuming to 
generate in the society. See e.g., PINOTTI, Paolo. Trust and regulation: addressing a cultural bias. Bank 
of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) No, 2009, 721. 
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Nonetheless, those arguments can be generalized, at least up to a certain 
extent. In fact, there is a misalignment between bail-in eligible liabilities and 
the loss absorbency capacity of each of them, as designed by C.R.R./C.R.D. IV 
package. Thus, for resolution authorities writing down senior creditors claims 
will never be an easy call51 and it is plausible that resolution policy will opt for 
permanently using subordinated debt as a cushion even when the resolution 
mechanism will work at full speed. 
Despite the protection of senior creditors, the resolution has been 
greatly criticized. The widely perceived unfairness was mainly due to severe 
mismanagement in the allocation of those financial instruments. For example, 
resolved banks commonly asked their clients to subscribe subordinated bonds 
to open or keep credit lines for SMEs,52 as an informal collateral, without 
giving proper information about their risk profile, breaching de facto the 
standards established by Markets in Financial Instruments Directives 
(hereinafter MiFID).53  
As current final episode of this narrative, the Italian government 
provided for a reimbursement procedure for a portion of written-off debt 
holders.54 The overall result of this refund operation consists of shifting a part 
of the resolution burden from bank insiders to the banking system as a whole, 
via the National Resolution Fund, realizing a sort of “private bail-out” 
intervention. This aspect, together with the use of subordinated debt to protect 
senior creditors, can give an idea of the future resolution policies. 
As was expected, the conclusion of the story after the completion of the 
sale of the bridge institutions, will be that the new, viable, banks will not be 
strictu sensu “territorial” anymore. In fact, three out of four banks have been 
acquired by UBI Banca, while – at the time I am writing – there are still 
                                                          
51 See Binder, supra note 25.  
52 On the risk of allocating debt to bank’s clients, even for the overall stability of the institution, 
see Stanghellini, supra note 36, at 161. 
53 See for an extensive introduction about MiFID, JEAN-PIERRE CASEY & KAREL LANNOO, THE MIFID 
REVOLUTION (2009). For what specifically concerns MiFID and subordinated debt, see Gotz et al., 
supra note 26. 
54 According to the procedure depicted in the D.L. n. 59/2016 – “Urgent measures for liquidating 
banks investors”. 
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ongoing negotiation with BPER for the last good banks still managed by the 
Bank of Italy.55  
It is important to notice how the acquirers of the good banks are going 
to pay just a symbolic price for the acquisition. The main issues on which the 
parties have been contracting about are the management of non performing 
loans (hereinafter N.P.L.) and the level of additional Common Tier Equity 1 
(hereainafter CET1) to be raised in order to be able to sustain those 
acquisitions. 
This conclusion could cause some problems to the S.M.Es. network and 
their funding costs; moreover, the lack of trust resulting from this story will 
not be easy to fix. Nonetheless, even if counterfactual assessments are always 
difficult to make and prove, the intuition is that the situation could have been 
far worst without this resolution intervention since the atomistic liquidation of 
the resolved banks would have threatened the continuity of the territorial 
S.M.Es. themselves. 
 
3.2 THE MARKET FOR SUBORDINATED DEBT IN THE ITALIAN BANKING SYSTEM 
To link the narrative of the resolution intervention of § 3.1 and the empirical 
analysis of § 4 is crucial to understand the scope and the functioning of the 
Italian market for banks subordinated bonds. Some figures about the market 
itself can give a quite accurate idea of what we are dealing with. 
The 31st October 2015, the issued subordinated bond amounted to €67,2 
billion of which €8.5 billion, i.e.: about 13% of the entire amount of issued 
bonds, were held by the issuing banks themselves. Thus, there were €58,7 
billion of bonds floating in the market, of which over the 50% allocated to 
individual investors and households (thirty-one billion).56 
Again, some figures might facilitate the understanding of what €67 
billion mean in the Italian banking system: the total assets of the seventh 
                                                          
55 Insofar, there are no ufficial documents nor discosure of contractual terms, but only an official 
press release from the Bank of Italy, (2015)  
https://www.bancaditalia.it/media/comunicati/documenti/2017-01/cs_good_bank.pdf. 
56 See BANK OF ITALY, Informazione sui detentori di obbligazioni subordinate [Information about 
subordinated bond holder]. Unfortunately there are no data available on the share who are also client of the 
issuing bank. 
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Italian banking group (Banco Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna) amount to €61 
billion and the total regulatory capital of the first Italian banking group 
(Unicredit) amounts to €55 billion.  
Moreover, investing in banks’ subordinated bonds seems to be very 
popular when looking at household investment preferences. In fact, in 2015 the 
volume of Italian household financial investments is €3,848 billion of which 
727 are bank deposits, and only 60 billion are listed stocks,57 while 30 are in 
banks subordinated debt (i.e.: almost 1% of total investments).  
A possible explanation of those figures could be that Italian households 
are highly risk-adverse and under the previous regime, where the State 
indirectly subsidized banks bonds through the implicit guarantee of bail-outs, 
this type of investment attracted them since the risk profile was close to zero 
and the interest rate was about 1.5 % higher than that of senior bonds.58 
After the new regulatory stream, some variations were predictable; 
nevertheless, the events of November 2015 triggered what seems to be an 
enormous revolution. Indeed, those resolution interventions made clear to 
everybody, and in particular to small and medium banks under the direct 
supervision of Bank of Italy, that the new European rules – despite all the 
effectiveness and efficiency concerns – would have been to be actually applied.  
First of all, it is necessary to distinguish between the biggest banks in 
the system and all the others. In fact, for Intesa San Paolo and Unicredit, which 
are the only two Italian S.I.F.Is., the market for subordinated bonds is going to 
disappear because of the lack of supply. Intesa has not issued retail 
subordinated bond in the last four years, while Unicredit launched a huge 
buyback campaign for floating subordinated debt from the beginning of 2016.59 
Those are the only two Italian commercial banks that can afford to shut 
down that market, thanks to multiple funding sources and greater stability. For 
                                                          
57 Accord, Banca d’Italia, Gli investimenti delle famiglie italiane: solo l’1,5% è destinato alle azioni quotate 
[Investments of Italians families: just 1,5% addressed to the Stock Exchange], IL SOLE 24 ORE, March 27, 
2015, at 3. 
58 A partial empiric confirmation of this substitability effect can be found in Regression Table 1 
(Appendix), where “Bond Spead” depict a sort of beauty contest between Subordinted Debt issued 
by banks and 10y Italian Governamental Bond. 
59 Unicredit offered to buy back up to 1.8 billion of subordinated bonds. According to the last 
information available the share of adhesion was over 60%. Compare  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f5d8fb6a-c04b-11e5-9fdb-87b8d15baec2.html. 
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all the other banks the stream of financial reforms affects the demand side and 
the pricing mechanism. 
 
Table 2 – Banks Subordinated Debt Market in Italy. Bank of Italy, 2015b 
On one hand, the demand side of the market for subordinated debt, even if it is 
an ongoing process and no specific data are now available, a simple and 
straightforward prediction can be stated: the increased risk profile will cause a 
shift from households and non-professional investors to professional and 
institutional investors.  
On the other hand, a more accurate description – even though not 
systematic – of the price for subordinated bonds is feasible since that type of 
data is more steadily available. Before 22nd November 2015 the average gross 
yield of a basket composed by eighty-nine subordinated bond was 4.68%. At 
the beginning of January 2016, the average gross yield of the same bundle of 
bonds skyrocketed to 6.18%. Moreover, sixteen out of eighty-nine bonds 
yielded more than 10%, of which seven even more than 20%.60 The most 
expensive bonds were issued by banks perceived as particularly vulnerable by 
the market (e.g.: Monte Dei Paschi di Siena and Banca Popolare di Vicenza), 
which is consistent with the lack of implicit State guarantee.  
Those data appear quite astonishing, but they are – at least in part – to 
the shock provoked by the resolution intervention of the last November. Thus, 
to precisely evaluate the actual spread between the yields before and after the 
                                                          
60 Data from SkipperInformatica. With Nicola Borzi, Bond subordinati nella bufera: i rendimenti si 
impennano [Bond subordinated in the storm/blizzard: the profits nose up], IL SOLE 24 ORE, January 20, 
2016Il Sole 24 Ore, (Jan. 20, 2016). 
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bail-in regulation, more time is going to be necessary, even though the 
tendency is clear and indicates a remarkable increase in subordinated bond 
prices in the long run either. 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE DETERMINANTS OF SUBORDINATED DEBT 
In the previous Section, the resolution intervention and its first spillover 
effects were discussed both from the banks, investors and regulatory 
standpoint; the next step consists in empirically investigating whether the 
decision of issuing subordinated bonds has some structural determinants. 
Therefore, the question that this paragraph aims to answer is whether there 
are reliable determinants that lead a bank to issue subordinated bonds. 
This is quite an uncommon step for a legal paper,61 nonetheless what 
follows is going to make clear, at least I hope, how an empirical investigation 
of legal issues can be useful to – in this very case – evaluate the possibility of 
implementing more tailored resolution interventions on subordinated bonds in 
the future.  
As far as I am aware, there are no specific studies dedicated to the 
determinants of subordinated bonds in the banking industry, neither for 
general corporate subordinated bonds. Nonetheless, the corporate finance 
literature62 about determinants of capital and debt structure for non-financial 
firms is impressively extensive and represents the unavoidable starting point 
of this analysis.63 In fact, that literature stems from the departure of Modigliani 
and Miller irrelevance proposition, as analyzed under Section § 2.1.  
                                                          
61 Even though “Empirical legal studies” is for sure an expanding and successful field of research. 
For a sound introduction on this research methodology see ROBERTO M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. 
ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS ULEN, EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW (2010). 
62 That stream of literature dealing with funding and capital structure decisions of both financial 
and non-financial corporations. For a survey and introduction, even though not updated, see e.g., 
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from 
international data, 50 THE J. FIN. 1421 (1995). 
63 In addition, the empirical corporate finance literature generated over time a certain degree of 
consensus about some standard variables related to the capital structure of non-financial firms. 
See e.g., Sheridan Titman & Roberto Wessels, The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice. 43 THE J. 
FIN. 1 (1988).; Milton Harris &Artur Raviv, The Theory of Capital Structure, 46 THE J. FIN. 297 (1991); 
Id.; and Murray Z. Frank Vidhan K. Goyal, Capital structure decisions: which factors are reliably 
important?, 38 FIN. MGMT. 1 (2009). 
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This represents quite an uncommon approach, since the standard one for 
banking capital structure is based on capital requirement regulations as the 
only significant departure from Modigliani and Miller proposition,64 paying no 
attention to capital and debt structure of financial firms. Anyhow, stemming 
from corporate finance literature, there are recent studies focused on banks’ 
capital structure that deviate from the classical approach. Heider and Gropp65 
focused on bank’s leverage, showing a high grade of similarity between their 
empirical evidence and other studies carried out on non-financial firms. Thus, 
they concluded that capital requirements are not a first order determinant for a 
bank’s capital structure. For what more closely concerns debt structure, 
Santos66 showed a cost advantage for larger banks in raising debt which is only 
partially due to the “too big to fail” policy.  
Speaking specifically about subordinated debt, the most useful and 
enlightening study has been carried out by Zanghini,67 both for the contents 
and methodology. He analysed the bank bonds spread, focusing on the role of 
implicit and explicit public guarantees through the analysis of “Asset swap 
spread” of different bonds. Moreover, Pop68 empirically proved the intuitive 
idea according to which subordinated creditors are more sensitive than seniors 
to the risk profile of the issuing institution. 
Applying all this theoretical and empirical insights to the present case 
study, the rest of § 4 tries to establish reliable determinants for Italian 
subordinated debt issuances in the banking industry. 
 
4.1 SAMPLE AND VARIABLES 
The analyzed sample consists of twenty-five Italian parent banks that have 
available balance sheet data on subordinated debt in BankScope Bureau Van 
                                                          
64 See FREDERIC MISHKIN & ADDISON WESLEY, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 
(6th ed., 2000). 
65 GROPP, Reint; HEIDER, Florian. The determinants of bank capital structure. ECB Working Paper 
Series n. 1096/2009. 
66 SANTOS, João AC. Evidence from the Bond Market on Banks ''Too-Big-To-Fail'' Subsidy. Economic 
Policy Review, Forthcoming, 2014. 
67 ZAGHINI, Andrea. Bank bonds: size, systemic relevance and the sovereign. Working Paper n- 966. 
Bank of Italy. 
68 POP, Adrian. Market discipline in international banking regulation: keeping the playing field 
level. Journal of Financial Stability, 2006, 2.3: 286-310. 
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Dijk DataBase. In building the panel database, the considered time series goes 
from 2006 to 2015. 
Starting from balance sheet data of those banks, the analysis focuses on 
the listed subordinated bonds issued both in Eurobond and Italian Market, 
according to the information available in Pillar 3 documents about issued 
bonds of each bank of the sample. The specific financial data for each of those 
bonds has been analyzed through Thomson Reuters DataBase. 
The final database is made up of 102 bonds issued by thirteen banks. 
The small number of analyzed banks is due to the fact that most of the small 
Italian banks issued only retail and non-listed subordinated bonds whose data 
are not available. Nevertheless, the sample turns out to be quite representative 
for big and medium Italian banks. Furthermore, some of the results, after a 
case by case analysis based on economic theory and common sense, can be 
generalized even for small banks. 
Because of the different dates of issue of the analyzed bond, the sample 
results are unbalanced throughout the time series. Moreover, data on 
secondary market yields of the bonds were not or only partially available along 
the time series (427 yield observation out of 626 total ones). 
(See Table in the next page) 
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Table 3 – Summary Statistics 
Finally, the data on duration are biased by the fact that some of the 
subordinated bonds are perpetual, thus in the summary statistics of Table 3 are 
shown only the bonds with a defined time duration.69 
From a methodological point of view, in analyzing the data, the linear 
regression70 method is employed. That basically means to check whether the 
(increasing or decreasing) trend of the dependent variable is somehow 
correlated with the trend of one or some independent variables, thus 
establishing correlation linkages. In § 4.3 those correlation linkages are to be 
discussed in order to draw some policy conclusions. In discussing them a 
cornerstone is the level of statistical significance of those linkages, meaning 
the level of certainty that the actual level of correlation is different from zero. 
As a rule of thumb, a 95% confidence is considered a good threshold to draw 
reliable inferences.  
 
                                                          
69 For a deeper description of the variables used in the study see the Appendix. 
70 All the regressions are run with the Random Effect estimation method, to catch both the cross-
sectional and time variances. Random Effect has been preferred over Fixed Effect after running the 
Hausmann-test. Robust Error estimation has been used as well to avoid heteroskedasticity 
problems. 
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4.2 HOW TO UNDERSTAND DECISIONS ON SUBORDINATED DEBT ISSUANCE? 
Using the data set defined above, this study aims to understand what are the 
drivers of decisions about subordinated debt both from the bank and the 
investor point of view. In order to do that, the data described in the previous 
sub-paragraph are used to approximate different aspects concerning the 
decision of both the issuer and the investor.  
For the sake of simplicity, what follows is a mere qualitative description 
of this process, which explains the variable approximating those decisions 
(dependent variable) and the variables analyzed to explain such decisions 
(independent variables). Then, in the footnotes and in the Appendix, the 
economic and econometric underlying rationale of the models used in the 
analysis are discussed in more detailed. Throughout the study, the bank’s 
decision of issuing subordinated debt has been disentangled and analyzed 
under two related but still different perspectives: the decision concerning the 
overall financial structure of the firm and the decision specifically concerning 
the structure of regulatory capital.  
Firstly, to understand the determinants of these decisions, the data 
analyzed are related to financial data of the bank (e.g.: balance sheet structure; 
N.P.L. patio etc.); financial data of the specific bond (e.g.: yield) and some 
approximation of the bank-specific role of the regulator.71 Secondly, the 
variation on subordinated debt issuances over the last decade is taken into 
consideration. This is important to understand if economic or legal shocks (i.e.: 
financial crisis and reform implementation) played a decisive role in the 
subordinated debt market. Practically, the same variables are to be explained; 
but now only the evolution over time is computed in order to explain the 
variations. Finally, the issue at stake is further disentangled taking into 
account the investors’ decisions, which are approximated through the yield on 
the secondary market and the spread between those yields and the yield of 
ten-year Italian governmental bonds. This proxy makes sense since the 
average duration of the analyzed bonds is over nine years, thus investing in 
banks subordinated debt can be considered a close substitute of investing in 
                                                          
71 For more detailed on the variables used see Appendix, Variable List Table, where a detailed 
description of the variables is provided. 
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Italian Treasury bond, and so it represents the perfect benchmark for the 
present study. 
 
4.3 ARE THERE RELIABLE DETERMINANTS? 
Regression Tables 1, 2 and 3 in the Appendix summarize the empirical findings 
of the models depicted in the previous paragraph. 
The first interesting insight concerns the sharply different outcome in 
the decisions about financial and regulatory capital structure, indicating that 
each bank has to face two distinct orders of decisions, following separate 
aspects.  
For what concerns financial structure decisions the ‘Capital ratio’ and 
‘Tier1 ratio’ parameters sign and magnitude are consistent with common 
sense: the higher the capital ratio, the higher the subordinated debt ratio; the 
higher the Tier1 ratio, the lower the subordinated debt structure.  
The highly statistical significance of the negative parameter of the 
dummy “E.C.B. supervision” shows that the less systemic a bank is, the higher 
the share of subordinated debt. In fact, the S.S.M. entered into force only in 
2015. Thus, that variable only indicates the relevance of the requirements to be 
subjected to direct E.C.B. supervision, which are – indeed – about the systemic 
importance of the banking institution within European and domestic banking 
system. 
The significant negative parameter of N.P.L. ratio is of particular 
importance since it is becoming the major issue for the problematic Italian 
(and even European) banking system. The relatively high-risk profile of the 
subordinated bonds can explain this evidence: for a bank with a high N.P.L. 
ratio funding itself by subordinated debt represents a too expensive option. 
On the other hand, in deciding the structure of regulatory capital, the 
banks are remarkably influenced by the spread between the yield of 
subordinated bonds and the ten-year Italian governmental bond: the higher 
the spread, the larger the share of subordinated capital. This can be explained 
 
University of Bologna Law Review 
[Vol.2:2 2017] 
https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.2531-6133/7664 
 
277 
 
by the particular attractiveness of investing in bank’s subordinated bonds, for 
the reasons discussed in § 3.2. 
Another important result, confirming the E.C.B. supervision 
requirement as a proxy for systemic relevance, is the negative highly statistical 
significance of the size indicating that for smaller banks the subordinated debt 
funding option is more convenient compared to bigger banks. 
What is constant throughout all the regressions in Regression Table 1 - 
Appendix is the remarkably high (99.9% level), though conflicting, 
significance of two different profitability ratios, namely the “Return on 
Average Assets – R.O.A.A.” and the “Return on Average Equity – R.O.A.E.”. In 
particular, a higher R.O.A.A. is positively correlated with a higher ratio of 
subordinated debt, while R.O.A.E. is negatively correlated with subordinated 
debt ratio. Hence, the profitability of the bank is an important argument for 
issuing subordinated debt: only the above-average performing banks can 
afford to release a high level of subordinated debt, but still if a bank is highly 
capitalized (which leads to a high ROAE) the level of subordinated debt 
decrease. Thus, between equity and subordinated debt, a certain degree of 
substitutability seems to exist, on top of the regulatory capital threshold. 
Finally, another variable which is constantly highly statistically 
significant and with positive parameter throughout the regressions (always at 
99.9% level) is the ratio between loans and assets. Hence, issuing subordinated 
bonds is a common way to fund, at least in part, marginal loans over the 
average level of the sample. That represents a crucial contingency since the 
credit crunch has been considered one of the primary determinates of the 
Italian (and more generally European) economic stagnation after the global 
financial crisis; consequently, this finding turns out to be particularly dense of 
policy implications.72  
Some of those findings are of particular interests, and their policy 
implication will be analyzed later on in this chapter. However, to make this 
                                                          
72 The equations which comprehend all the variable categories prove to fits particularly well to the 
data, explaining the 50% and 75% of variations, respectively for financial structure and regulatory 
capital structure decisions. 
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analysis as accurate as possible, some further insights can be added thanks to 
the second and third models introduced in the previous paragraph.  
The fact that the high-level subordinated debt issuers have both higher 
loan-to-asset-ratio and lower N.P.L.-ratio is striking. In fact, for an 
institution with lower borrowing opportunities is expected to exert a more 
careful evaluation of the marginal loans, therefore resulting in a lower N.P.L.-
ration. A possible explanation is that subordinated debt holders actually 
monitor better what is going on in the bank, resulting in better choices about 
marginal borrowers. This is somehow in line with the study carried out by 
Sironi in 2003;73 nevertheless, it is in contrast with the actual identity of debt 
holder underlined in § 3, mostly non-professional retail investors. A plausible 
alternative explanation is that the correlation between N.P.L. and level of 
subordinated debt entails a better risk taking by the management of the bank 
which is determined by unobservables (i.e.: variables that are not included in 
the statistical analysis). This latter explanation, even though it falls out of the 
model hereby proposed, seems to be more plausible. 
For what concerns the variations over time (Regression Table 2 in 
Appendix), the regressions show pretty different pictures for the decisions 
about financial and regulatory capital structure. The latter has an irregular and 
not always significant path in the first years of the time series, while the 
coefficient of 2013 and 2014 are highly statistically significant, positive and big 
in magnitude. Those years were crucial for the implementation of new 
European Banking framework, with the entrance into force of C.R.D. IV/C.R.R., 
the proposals of the new Banking Union and the document about Burden 
Sharing in banking crisis. This evidence confirms the arguments of Chapter § 3 
about the role of subordinated debt as a cushion to protect senior creditors.  
On the other hand, in the decision about financial structure, the most 
notable outcome of the time dummy model is the highly statistically 
significant increase in subordinated debt share during the hardest years of the 
global financial crisis (2008-2010).  
                                                          
73 Sironi, supra note 19. 
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Finally, the regressions shown in Table 7 give a perspective on the investor’s 
point of view when deciding whether to invest in banks subordinated bonds or 
in something else.  
Consistently with common sense and basic economic theory, the higher 
the class of regulatory capital (i.e.: the greater the loss absorbency capacity of 
the financial instrument), the higher the yield of the bond. What is less 
intuitive is that the bond rating variable has the expected negative coefficient 
though is not statistically significant. The same can be said for the N.P.L. ratio, 
meaning that investors relied on other types of information or, simpler, on the 
implicit guarantee of the domestic sovereign. Thus, those regressions perfectly 
depict the past but have a (hopefully) small capacity to predict what is going to 
happen in the future, since the old paradigm generates some biases in the 
regressions. 
Nevertheless, there are two elements that are likely to hold even in the 
future: firstly, the profitability and size of the banks will remain an argument 
in investor’s decisions. Secondly, there is a highly significant but slight cost 
advantage for bigger issues, which are usually adopted by larger banks, 
consistently with the findings by Santos (2014). On the other hand, there is a 
highly significant and substantial negative correlation between yield and bank 
profitability (measured through R.O.A.A.) which still have a straightforward 
explanation. 
Another intuitive finding, useful to confirm the consistency of the 
model, is shown in the time series, where the yield of subordinated bonds 
increased significantly in 2008, when the global financial crisis broke out and, 
only for the bond spread, in 2011 when the public debt crisis began. 
 
4.4 POLICY CONSEQUENCES  
The findings of the present empirical analysis lead to one main policy 
conclusion, namely: agreeing with I.M.F. in supporting subordinated debt as a 
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powerful tool to increase the soundness and resolvability of banking 
institutions.74 
In fact, summarizing the evidence shown by the models, the banks that 
are more likely to issue a high share of subordinated debt (i.e.: finding it a 
convenient funding decision) are the medium-small banks, which are not 
systemically relevant and whose level of performance is above average. Given 
those arguments, creating an institutional framework which is “subordinated-
debt-friendly” seems to foster efficiency. Moreover, it is also consistent with 
the goal of generating a level playing field among European banks as well, 
reducing the cost-advantage in complying with more requesting regulatory 
framework joined by bigger banks.75 
On the other hand, there is no evidence that the act of issuing 
subordinated bonds itself leads to moral hazard or adverse selection. In fact, 
issuing subordinated debt can lead to an inefficient outcome if: the supervisory 
activity is suboptimal, the implicit guarantee of the sovereign on bank solvency 
still exists, and the enforcement of the subordination clause through resolution 
tools is uncertain. Assuming an optimal suspensory activity,76 the implicit 
guarantee that characterized the last decades should not exist anymore in the 
new institutional framework;77 what remains a problem is the level of certainty 
in enforcement mechanism. This issue will be specifically tackled in Chapter § 
5. 
Beyond the arguments already discussed, previous empirical findings 
allow to add two other important aspects supporting the use of subordinated 
bonds in banks financing. First of all, issuing subordinated debt signals the 
market that the bank has the appropriate level of soundness to go to the 
market and sell those bonds at a reasonable price. Second of all, and more 
important, the higher the level of issued subordinated bonds the higher the 
level of loans granted. Such a contingency should be highly relevant for the 
                                                          
74 Davies, supra note 13, at 512. 
75 As proved by SANTOS, supra note 66. 
76 That is quite an unrealistic assumption, even though the S.S.M. reform improved the quality of 
supervision toward Eurozone Banks. See FERRARINI, Guido A. Single Supervision and the Governance 
of Banking Markets. ECGI-Law Working Paper, 2015, 294. 
77 Still, this assumption is not completely true since B.R.R.D. leaves a certain room for bail-outs 
intervention: Council Directive 2014/59, art 100, 2014 O.J. (L 173). Nonetheless, for the sake of this 
analysis this represents a workable assumption. 
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European policy makers since there is a broad consensus in considering the 
credit crunch as one of the crucial determinants of the prolonged economic 
stagnation of Eurozone.78 
Chapter 3 showed that current institutions (both formal and informal 
institutions and their enforcement mechanisms) might lead to a lack of 
incentives to issue subordinated bonds. Then, this Chapter strengthens the 
arguments in favor of desirability for a dynamic market for subordinated 
bonds. Hence, the last step of this paper will be devoted to proposing an 
institutional framework with an enhanced degree of certainty in the 
enforcement (i.e.: resolution) phase. 
 
 
5. CONVERTIBLE SUBORDINATED BOND: A SOLUTION THROUGH CONTRACTS? 
Given the uncertainty and unpredictability underlined in the previous sections, 
the question arising is whether the current institutional framework furnishes 
efficient incentives to all the relevant agents to foster the resilience of the 
bank. Borrowing from Douglas North:79 is the institutional matrix providing a 
pay-off matrix which leads the actors to act efficiently?  
To answer this question, the outcome of the empirical study carried out 
in Section § 4 has to be combined with some other insights about bail-in in 
general. First of all, under Article 37 § 10 sub. a, any sort of bail-out operations 
become lawful if and only if at least the of 8% of the bank’s liabilities were 
written down. Some scholars80 predicted the tendency to prefer a “private bail-
out solution” right after the 8% threshold has been reached. “Private bail-out” 
solutions indicate all the available mechanisms providing external funds to the 
distressed bank without a direct State intervention or a market operation.81 
                                                          
78 Juan R. Cuarado-Roura, Ron Martin & Andrés Rodrìguez-Pose, The economic crisis in Europe: urban 
and regional consequences, 9 CAMBRIDGE J. REGIONS, ECON. AND SOC’Y 3 (2016). 
79 Duglas C. North, Institutions and the performance of economies over time, in HANDBOOK OF NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 21-30 (2008). 
80 Goodhart & Avgouleas, supra note 7, at 20; MCANDREWS, supra note 46.  
81 Council Directive 2014/59, supra note 77, art. 100 and ff. 
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In the second place, the fact that during the 2007-08 crisis the losses of the 
distressed banks were in average, around 8%.82 Thus the expected outcome in a 
2007 crisis scenario with the new regulatory framework can be depicted as 
follows: the new regulation determines the need to bail-in the 8% of 
distressed banks liabilities; therefore, subordinated debt will act, in practice, as 
a cushion to protect senior creditors. 
Piecing all these aspects together, subordinated bondholders suffer a 
high uncertainty about their investment, and they cannot correctly ex-ante 
assess this risk. In fact, the investors do not only face the risk of bank 
insolvency, but also the risk to be bailed-in by the resolution authority, 
according to the non-strictly quantitative trigger events of Article 32. Thus, the 
predictable outcome is to overestimate the risk, asking for an abnormally high 
yield and subsequently reducing the scope of subordinated bond market, as the 
Italian case depicted in Section § 3 suggests.  
To make the investment in subordinated bonds feasible for both banks 
and investors, this Section proposes a contractual solution setting a trigger 
event to convert or write-down the creditors’ claim, tailored upon the model 
offered by “Contingent Convertible” bonds. In fact, subordinated bonds seem 
to be pretty attractive for both investors and several banks; moreover, they 
turn to be important even from the resolution authority’s standpoint,83 to 
protect senior creditor from bail-in and, hence, safeguarding some degree of 
trust within the banking system. 
While the issue of certainty in subordinated bond investments is still 
without an answer, two recent proposals for amending B.R.R.D. could somehow 
change the role of subordinated debt as a cushion of senior creditors. In fact, 
the European Commission issued two proposals of Directive amending the 
B.R.R.D. in order to implement T.L.A.C. requirements.84 What is of interests for 
                                                          
82 Conlon & Cotter, supra note 24; See also Paolo Santella et al., Il Nuovo Regime Europeo Di 
Risoluzione Delle Crisi Bancarie: Un’Analisi Comparata Dell’Applicazione Del Bail-In [A Comparative 
Analysis of the Bail-In Regime in Europe], 9 BANCARIA 46-62 (2015). 
83 Davies, supra note 13, at 512. 
84 Commission Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
Amending Directive 2014/59/EU on Loss-Absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of Credit 
Institutions and Investment Firms and Amending Directive 98/26/EC, Directive 2002/47/EC, 
Directive 2012/30/EU, Directive 2011/35/EU, Directive 2005/56/EC, Directive 2004/25/EC and 
Directive 2007/36/EC, COM (2016) 852 final (Nov. 23, 2016); and Commission Proposal for a 
DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on Amending Directive 
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the present paper is the proposal to establish an intermediate class of bail-
inable liabilities which lies in between subordinated and senior debt, as of 
hierarchy of creditors’ claim. The “new class” of creditors could be written 
down only during a formal resolution intervention and not with a plain on-
going write-down. The purpose of the proposal is helping banking institutions 
to match the T.L.A.C. requirement at a reasonable price, protecting senior 
creditor creditors even further. 
On the one hand, those proposed amendments are consistent with – 
and even confirm –the main idea carried out in this paper, i.e.: de jure condito, 
subordinated liabilities act as a cushion for protecting senior creditors. On the 
other hand, as noticed above, the main problem that has been identified in the 
paper (i.e.: uncertainty) is not solved, but just shifted and pooled between two 
different classes. Thus, the prospective implementation of those proposals will 
not falsify the arguments of this study, which should just be accordingly re-
shaped. 
For those reasons, the analysis that follows is carried out de jure 
condito, i.e.: without taking into consideration the possible changes if the 
latter proposal will be implemented 
The following sub-section provides an introduction to the idea of 
contractual bail-in in the literature and the current institutional framework; 
eventually, that same framework will be compared with the conditions under 
which a contractual arrangement is a value-creating institution in the classic 
law and economics sense.85  
 
5.1 CONTRACTUAL CLAUSE FOR WRITING DOWN AND CONVERSION: A PROBLEM SOLVING TOOL  
Literature about contractual clauses to convert debt into equity, and thus 
enhance capital stability and bank resilience, is extensive and precede the 
global financial crisis,86 even if the concrete applications are few and 
                                                                                                                                                               
2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as Regards the Ranking of Unsecured 
Debt Instruments in Insolvency Hierarchy, COM (2016) 853 final (Nov. 23, 2016). 
85 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 283 (6th ed., 2011). 
86 See Mark J. Flannery, No Pain, No Gain? Effecting Market Discipline via ‘‘Reverse Convertible 
Debentures’’, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL: BANKING, SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE 171 (2005). 
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ambiguous in their results.87 This mechanism is usually labeled as “Contingent 
Capital Instruments” or “CoCo Bonds”. A major distinction is drawn between 
high-trigger and low-trigger instruments, where the event that triggers the 
conversion for the former is to reach the minimum capital requirement, while 
for the latter the trigger point is set to a higher level of capital ratio. 
Coffee88 approaches contingent capital as a tool to avoid the necessity to 
bail-out banks and, at the same time, to preserve the financial stability of the 
banking system, which – in his view – would be threatened by a pure bail-in 
scenario. Thus, the mandatory contingent capital regime is seen as a substitute 
and not as a complement of the bail-in mechanism.  
Even though this approach is far from the position of the present paper, 
some aspects underlined by Coffee are of utmost interest. High-trigger 
contingent capital instruments allow banks to create adequate “potential” 
capital buffers, increase the level of certainty of investments and have a tax 
advantage over the “raise more equity” option.  
In contrast with the latter approach, Tucker incisively noticed: “Today, 
Cocos with decently high triggers are likely to be prohibitively expensive . . . . 
Eventually, I can conceive that Cocos with highish triggers might be issued as a 
means for the market to maintain control of its own destiny in the shadow of 
resolution”.89 
This scenario acquired a new and broader meaning with the entrance 
into force of the post-crisis resolution frameworks. The issuance of Cocos must 
happen “in the shadow of resolution”, which means that the contingent capital 
instruments are – by definition – a complement and not a substitute of bail-in 
mechanism, so the Coffee’s model is entirely overturned, at least in the 
Eurozone.  
The B.R.R.D. provides two foremost normative references to the role of 
contractual clauses in the bail-in process. Article 55 deals with the typical case 
where the bonds are issued under a non-E.U. applicable law (e.g.: bonds issued 
                                                          
87 See Carolin E. Schmidt, Ted F. Azarmi, The Impact Of CoCo Bonds On Bank Value And Perceived 
Default Risk: Insights And Evidence From Their Pioneering Use In Europe, 31 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 2297 
(2015). 
88 COFFEE, John. Bail-ins versus bail-outs: using contingent capital to mitigate systemic risk. Columbia Law 
and Economics Working Paper, 2010, 380. 
89 Tucker, supra note 23, at 8. 
 
University of Bologna Law Review 
[Vol.2:2 2017] 
https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.2531-6133/7664 
 
285 
 
under the New York State law are quite common), asking for a contractual 
recognition of the power of conversion and write-down. This aspect is crucial 
to make bail-in effective since one of the biggest problems in previous 
resolution attempts were exactly the cross-border issues.90  
Even more interesting for this paper is Article 45 (13) and (14) about 
M.R.E.L.91: this can be reached issuing debt instruments with contractual clause 
for conversion and write-down, following two conditions:  
- The Resolution Authority is free to write down or convert the 
contractual instrument in case of resolution;  
- The contractual clause is applied to a subordinated debt instrument.  
So, the B.R.R.D. only keeps the possibility of contractual bail-in open, on the 
contrary of the Swiss Regulator which impose a mandatory 3% R.W.A. of high-
trigger Cocos92. 
Davies93 noticed how such a clause would reverse the hierarchy in 
bearing losses, meaning that subordinated creditors bear losses before 
shareholders. This contingency seems to contrast with all the three principals 
of creditor treatment stated by Article 34 B.R.R.D., confirming again that it 
provides only disposable rights which generate ex post legal remedies (i.e.: 
liability and not property rules).  
 
5.2 INCENTIVE STRUCTURE OF RELEVANT ACTORS 
Given all the background information of § 5.1, the last question has still to be 
answered: “Is the institutional framework depicted in the previous paragraph 
giving adequate incentives to all the relevant actors?”. In order to properly 
answer, the relevant variables discussed in this section are four: the incentives 
of the management, the role of resolution authority, the desirability of ex-ante 
                                                          
90 Gleeson, supra note 9, at 274. 
91 See European Banking Authority, Interim report on MREL, EBA-Op-2016-12, at 76 (Jul. 19, 
2016). 
92 Stefan Avdjiev, Anastasia V. Kartasheva & Bilyana Bogdanova, CoCos: a primer, BANK INT’L 
SETTLEMENT QUARTERLY REV., Sept. 2013, at 43. See AVDJIEV, Stefan; KARTASHEVA, Anastasia V.; 
BOGDANOVA, Bilyana. CoCos: a primer. Available at SSRN 2326334, 2013. 
93 Davies, supra note 13, at 511. 
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rights (i.e.: governance power) to bondholders; the trigger event and 
conversion formula. 
1) Management: the fundamental aspect to be analyzed is whether the 
issuance of subordinated debt with contractual bail-in clause incentivizes the 
incumbent management to assume opportunistic behaviors or excessive risk 
taking. 
For what concerns opportunistic behavior, the underlying assumption is that – 
in a non-strategic environment – the decision to issue subordinated debt is a 
function of the resolution authority conduct. Even though this assumption 
does not fully hold in the real world, for this analysis it represents a workable 
proxy. 
Article 28 B.R.R.D. provides the possibility to remove the incumbent 
management “where there is a significant deterioration in the financial 
situation”, while Article 34 § 1 (c) set as a general principle of each resolution 
intervention the dismissal of the incumbent board. In case of contractual 
conversion/write-down, the application of Article 34 is highly unlikely, so that 
the contractual write-down instruments act as a costly insurance paid by the 
bank to avoid a proper resolution intervention, hence their dismissal. To avoid 
such a risk, the threat set by Article 28 has to be credible, since the contractual 
conversion/write-down, even if it is not a proper resolution intervention, is 
still a “resolution-sensitive” occurrence. 
For what concerns excessive risk taking, the arguments stated above 
can be replicated. Moreover, as the empirical evidenced in § 4 showed, the 
issuance of subordinated bonds is correlated both with higher loan-to-asset-
ratio and lower N.L.P.-ratio. In a hypothetical scenario where the certainty 
about the subordinated bonds is enhanced, there is no reason to suspect that 
those evidence would be reversed. 
In a nutshell, the formal institutional framework theoretically allows 
giving suitable incentive to the management if and only if the enforcement 
mechanism works efficiently. 
2) Resolution Authority: the role of the Resolution Authority is perhaps 
the most important one. From this perspective the formal institutions seem to 
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be severely lacking, since the only direct provision on contractual clauses is 
Article 45 (13) and (14), where is stated the abstract possibility to issue those 
instruments to reach the M.R.E.L.. The bank and the investor enter into a 
contract and, at the same time, a third party (the Resolution Authority) might 
affect a great deal the situation that the contract aims to discipline. In this 
situation, there is no or very little room for a cooperative solution (i.e.: 
conclude the deal) since the payoff matrix is highly unpredictable. 
A possible settlement for this problem is to make the Resolution 
Authority enter somehow into the agreement. The easiest and cheapest way to 
do so would be to submit the issuance contract to the resolution authority and 
ask for its formal inclusion in the resolution plan,94 stating that the terms of 
the contract are consistent with a sound resolution planning and, thus, will be 
respected by the Authority in case of future interventions. This solution would 
also help to ex-ante mitigate the risk of strategic issuance of the management 
since the Resolution Authority shall control the consistency of the issuance 
with the safe and soundness of the banking institution in an on-going concern. 
3) Investors: as noted above, because of the contractual bail-in clause, 
the investors give up some of the rights provided by the Article 34 of the 
Directive. Thus, granting some ex-ante “property” protection could seem 
reasonable.95 A pragmatic approach suggests avoiding the creation of well-
design but too complicated and ineffective mechanisms to let subordinated 
creditors protect ex-ante their entitlement. In fact, the effectiveness of the 
shareholder’s empowerment rights is ambiguous, and the possibility to 
enhance the corporate governance in the case of subordinated bondholders is 
limited. Therefore, the transaction costs generated by introducing those rights 
are particularly likely to outweigh some, uncertain and unpredictable, 
benefits.96 
                                                          
94 For what concerns the crucial role of resolution planning, which was not possible to properly 
describe throughout this paper, see Binder, 2015. 
95 For example including in the contract some powers modeled on the rights granted to 
shareholders to empower their position vis-à-vis the board. On shareholder’s empowerment, see 
Van Der Elst, 2014:30-33 and Denes et al., 2016. 
96 Those arguments hold for what specifically concerns the case for contingent convertible holder. 
A completely different scenario can be depicted in general for the need of corporate governance 
rights to bail-inalble creditors after B.R.R.D. On those issue see extensively Mülbert, P. O., & 
Citlau, R. D. (2011). The uncertain role of banks’ corporate governance in systemic risk 
regulation. ECGI–Law Working Paper, (179)  Chiu, I. H. (2014). Corporate governance: the missing 
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Even though giving specific substantive rights turn out to be ineffective and 
too expensive, this does not mean that there is absolutely no room for some 
recognition of the “contractual bail-in bondholder” status, at least from a 
procedural perspective. In fact, this type of investors should be recognized as 
an independent class, expressively allowing them to act collectively. This 
represents a value-creating device since it gives more contractual power to the 
investors, which will be incentivized to enter into the contract because of 
decreasing transaction costs, at least in two contingencies:  
i) before and regardless any resolution intervention, in case of 
renegotiation of the contract (savings in bargaining costs); 
ii) after a resolution in suing the bank to obtain a compensation 
(savings in enforcement costs). 
From this point of view, the European institutional framework seems to be 
completely lacking. In fact, a uniform procedural rule for civil justice are far to 
be reached within the European Union nor specific rules concerning these 
issues are provided by the Directive. Thus, the concrete configuration of the 
investors’ rights and claims is devolved to national laws, undermining the 
“level playing field” among E.U. countries, which is one of the primary goals of 
the B.R.R.D..97 
4) Trigger Event and Conversion Formula: represents the most 
awkward clause of the contract for convertible subordinated bonds. Indeed, 
most of the Contingent Capital literature focuses on this instance developing 
elaborated theoretical models.98 In this paper is not possible to add any 
contribution to such a complex and technical dispute. Anyhow. what is of 
interest here is whether the current institutional framework allows and 
incentivize to adopt the efficient solution. 
The answer seems to be positive since neither the Directive nor the 
Guideline on the trigger event99 or conversion rate100 forbids to agree on a 
                                                                                                                                                               
paradigm in the mandatory bail-in regime for creditors of banks and financial 
institutions. Journal of Business Law, (8). 
97 See Council Directive 2014/59, recital 57, 108, 2014 O.J. (173). 
98 For a survey, see Glasserman, P., and Nouri, B. (2012). Contingent capital with a capital-ratio 
trigger. Management Science, 58(10), 1816-1833. 
99 European Banking Authority, Final Report, Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on the 
contractual recognition of write-down and conversion powers under Article 55(3) of Directive 
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tailored solution, with the external limit of respecting the bail-in principle 
stated in Article 34, leaving to the market any further consideration. 
Nonetheless, to incentivize the investors to enter into those contracts and to 
give the market appropriate signals, the conversion formula should favor the 
creditors and burden shareholders.101 The potential (plausible) negative 
externalities of some specific kind of trigger event shall be addressed by the 
regulator in its “intervention”, as proposed above, under n. 3. 
The signaling effect is of particular importance both for creditors and 
the market in general. In fact, a conversion of debt into equity means a dilution 
in shareholders’ cash flows, and likely in management’s ones as well. Thus, a 
bank willing to issue those bonds with a decently high trigger and with a 
creditor-favorable conversion formula signal to the market and the perspective 
bondholders its soundness. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Throughout this study has been demonstrated – theoretically and empirically 
– that, following F.S.B. position, the existence of an active and functioning 
market for subordinated bonds enhance the soundness and the resolvability of 
banking institutions, especially of the medium-small ones. In fact, the cost 
advantage in raising funds of systemically important banks is reduced, and 
thus level playing field within European banking market is enhanced.  
The new regulatory framework for capital requirements and resolution 
of distressed institutions lead to tremendous changes in the market for 
subordinated bonds, both in their demand, supply and pricing mechanism. As a 
consequence, both banks and investors have to internalize all the costs and 
risks linked with subordinated bond; which is – at least theoretically – 
particularly desirable to incentivize more efficient decisions on funding 
decision, to avoid moral hazard and strategic behavior by both banks and 
                                                                                                                                                               
2014/59/EU, EBA/RTS/2015/06, (Jul. 3, 2015). 
100
 European Banking Authority, Consultation Paper, Draft Guidelines Concerning the 
Interrrelationship Between the BRRD sequence of writedown and conversion and CRR/CRD IV, 
EBA/CP/2014/29, (Oct. 1, 2014). 
101 COFFEE, supra note 88, at 35. 
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investors and, consequently, to enhance market discipline capacity of the 
secondary market. 
Nevertheless, due to the concrete bank’s financial structure and bail-in 
regulation, the subordinated debt in resolution, and especially if the Authority 
resorts to the bail-in tool, assumes the peculiar role of a cushion that allows 
protecting senior creditors from conversions or dilution in their claims. This 
leads to a high level of uncertainty in the enforcement of the subordination 
clause, which endangers the functioning of a market for subordinated bond.  
On the other hand, the empirical analysis carried out sub § 4 clearly 
showed the desirability of a well-functioning market for subordinated bonds, 
especially for its positive correlation with the lower level of N.P.Ls. and the 
higher level of loans over assets, i.e.: weakening the credit crunch. 
In a nutshell, the current institutional framework appears not to be able 
to give the appropriate incentives to both investors and banks to issue the right 
amount of subordinated bonds. Therefore, this paper concludes that a plain 
mandatory conversion and write down of subordinated debt does not achieve 
an efficient outcome because of the spillover effects that these rules have on 
subordinated debt market on a dynamic perspective. To fix those spillover 
effects and maintain all the positive innovation led by bail-in regulation, this 
paper proposes the adoption of a “contractual bail-in” regime, tailored on the 
contingent capital model. 
Finally, the paper shows the condition under which the “contractual 
bail-in” solution turns out to be appealing to banks and investors and, at the 
same time, desirable from the regulator’s standpoint, i.e.: the contractual 
solution enhance the soundness and resolvability of the regulated institutions. 
Even though all the actors are involved in the analysis, the role of the 
supervisory and resolution authorities in abstaining to infringe and protecting 
the property rights allocated by the contract is the first, necessary, condition to 
reach an efficient outcome and to balance as well as possible all the interests 
involved. 
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7. APPENDIX 
Variables list 
Rating From Thomson Reuters. It measures the rating (if 
available) for each bond. We relied on three different 
rating agency: Moody's, Fitch and S&P, according to the 
availability of complete data for the time series. The 
ratings are encoded to make them comparable, 
according to the conversion table published in BIS. See 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/qis/qisrating.htm. The higher 
the code assigned, the higher the rating. 
Coupon From Thompson Reuters. This variable can be 
continue or vary over time depending whether the 
bond provides for fixed, variable or floating coupon. 
Bond Spread 
 
Own calculation. Underlying variables from Thomson 
Reuters. The spread between the secondary market 
yield of each bond and the secondary market yield of 
10-year Italian governmental bond. The 10-yaer bond 
is taken as a benchmark since the duration mean of 
the subordinated bonds is over nine years, so the 10-
year bond represents a significant benchmark. 
Volume From Thomson Reuters. The amount in mil € of the 
issue calculated in the issue date and invariant over 
time. 
     Class of Capital 
 
From Thomson Reuters and Pillar 3 documents. 
Categorical variables which describe the class of 
regulatory capital to which the bond belongs. The 
available possibilities are Additional Tier 1; Tier 2; Low 
Tier 2 for Basel II agreements, now under the 
Grandfathering clause during the transitory period; 
not belonging to regulatory capital. 
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E.C.B. supervision 
 
From SSM website. Dummy variable describing 
whether the bank is under the direct supervision of 
the E.C.B. (in this case the value 1 is assigned). It 
measures whether the threshold provided by SSM 
regulation are significant but still say nothing about 
the impact of E.C.B. supervision since it started only 
two years ago. 
Capital Ratio  From BankScope. The ratio between total regulatory 
capital and total liabilities. 
Tier 1 ratio From BankScope. Ratio Between Tier 1 Capital and 
total liabilities 
n° companies From BankScope. Number of financial and non-
financial company controlled by the parent bank. It is 
used as a proxy of the complexity of the banking 
group. 
Return on Average 
Assets 
From BankScope. Measure the profitability of the 
bank. It is defined as the ratio between income and the 
average amount of assets. 
Return on Average 
Equity 
From BankScope. Measure the profitability of the 
bank. It is defined as the ratio between income and the 
average amount of common shares. 
Total assets (log) From BankScope. Total asset accounted on the balance 
sheet. 
N.P.L. ratio Own calculation. Underlying variables from 
BankScope. The ratio between substandard loans and 
total net loans. In building the variables we used 
"substandard loans" for the sake of pragmatism, since 
it was the only component of N.P.L. for which data 
where available throughout all the sample. Anyhow, 
substandard loans and the other component of N.P.L. 
are highly correlated; thus this variable is completely 
 
University of Bologna Law Review 
[Vol.2:2 2017] 
https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.2531-6133/7664 
 
293 
 
reliable. 
Loans over assets From BankScope. Describe the relative amount of 
loans granted by each bank. 
Sub. debt over 
regulatory capital 
From BankScope. Describe the ratio between the 
amount of issued subordinated debt and total 
regulatory capital. We use this variable as dependent 
to investigate the determinants of decision about 
capital structure for what concerns issuing 
subordinated debt. 
Sub. debt over total 
liabilities 
Own calculation. underlying variables from 
BankScope. Describe the ratio between the amount of 
issued subordinated debt and total liabilities on 
balance sheet We use this variale as dependent to 
investigate the determiants of decision about financial 
structure for what concerns issuing subordinated debt. 
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Regression Table 1 
 
Regression table on financial structure and regulatory capital structure 
decision and subordinated debt. Regressions are run with the random effect 
estimation method and robust error to avoid heteroskedasticity; t-statistic in 
parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 
0,1% levels, respectively 
The same independent variables are used to explain two different 
dependent variables which aim to describe the two distinct aspects above-
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mentioned, respectively: ‘subordinated debt over total liabilities’ and 
‘subordinated debt over regulatory capital’ according to the models in 
equations (1) and (2): 
 
(1) SubDebt/TotLiabilities = a0 + a1 Σ VBanki,t + a2 Σ VBondi,t + a3 Σ VRegulation i,t+ εi,t ; 
 
(2) SubDebt/RegCapital = a0 + a1 Σ VBanki,t + a2 Σ VBondi,t + a3 Σ VRegulation i,t+ εi,t ; 
 
where VBank are the variables characterizing the issuing bank (number of 
companies belonging to the group; Return on Average Assets; Return on 
Average Equity; Total Assets; Non-Performing Loans ratio; Loans over assets 
ratio); VBond are the variables characterizing the individual bond issued 
(Coupon; Volume; Rating; Bond Spread), and VRegulation are variables related to 
regulatory constraints on banking activity (dummy for class of capital; direct 
E.C.B. supervision; regulatory capital ratio; Tier 1 capital ratio). 
The regressions are run both separately for each category of variable 
and, eventually, with all the variables together.  
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Regression Table 2 
 
Regression table on financial structure and regulatory capital structure 
decision over time. Regressions are run with the fixed effect estimation 
method and robust error to avoid heteroskedasticity; t-statistic in parenthesis. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0,1% levels, 
respectively. 
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This issue is addressed as shown in equations (3) and (4), utilizes a time 
dummy variable to observe whether there has been some significant variation 
as a result of the introduction of new regulations or economic shocks. 
 
(3) SubDebt/TotLiabilities = a0 + a1 Σ Dtime+ εi,t ; 
(4) SubDebt/RegCapital = a0 + a1 Σ Dtime+ εi,t ; 
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Regression Table 3 
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Regression table on investors’ decisions on buying banks subordinated bonds. 
Regressions are run with the fixed effect estimation method and robust error 
to avoid heteroskedasticity; t-statistic in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0,1% levels, respectively. 
The investors decision are analyzed through equations (5) and (6):  
(5) Yield= a0 + a1 Σ VBanki,t + a2 Σ VBondi,t + a3 Ratingi,t+ a4 Σ Dtime + εi,t ; 
(6) BondSpread= a0 + a1 Σ VBanki,t + a2 Σ VBondi,t + a3 Σ VRegulation i,t+ a4 Σ Dtime+ εi,t ; 
where, where VBank are the variables characterizing the issuing bank (Return on 
Average Assets; Return on Average Equity; Total Assets); VBond are the variables 
characterizing the individual bond issued (Volume; Rating) and Dtime is a 
dummy variable for the time series. 
 
 
